Published on 12 August 2026

Too Big To Fail

In order to reduce risks for the state, taxpayers and the economy, systemically important ("too big to fail") banks must be better capitalised. Consequently, on 6 June 2025 the Federal Council set parameters for corresponding legislative and ordinance amendments. On 22 April 2026, he adopted the message on the revision of the Banking Act and amended the Capital Adequacy Ordinance. On 12 August 2026, it launched a consultation on amendments to the Banking Act and the Liquidity Ordinance.

Amendments to Banking Act and Liquidity Ordinance

Too-big-to-fail regulations: Federal Council launches consultation on amendments to Banking Act and Liquidity Ordinance
During its meeting on 12 August 2026, the Federal Council launched the consultation. The proposed measures complete the overall package aimed at strengthening the stability of the financial centre. The requirements on bank governance and on crisis preparations for systemically important banks are to be increased. The consultations will run until 19 November 2026.
More about «Too-big-to-fail regulations: Federal Council launches consultation on amendments to Banking Act and Liquidity Ordinance»

Press conference of the 12nd August 2026

Documentation

Questions and answers

Background to the bill

The revision comes in response to the Credit Suisse crisis of March 2023. To address the lessons learned from the crisis, and evaluate the existing regulations on systemically important banks (the too-big-to-fail, or TBTF, regime), on 10 April 2024 the Federal Council approved a report on banking stability, while the Parliamentary Investigation Committee (PInC), in its own report dated 17 December 2024, issued recommendations and subsequently referred some initiatives. The Federal Council defined the measures in more detail in the parameters it issued on 6 June 2025. The aim is to introduce a comprehensive package of measures that will close the gaps which the Federal Council and PInC have identified in the TBTF regime, and strengthen the regime so as to prevent financial crises, maintain systemically important functions and avoid state bailouts.
At its meeting on 12 August 2026, the Federal Council launched the consultation on measures relating to the senior managers regime, remuneration, FINMA tools and powers, recovery and resolution planning for systemically important banks and liquidity support from the SNB. A joint consultation process has been launched for these bills because of overlaps in their content, which allows the consultation participants to retain an overview. The measures supplement those already adopted by the Federal Council with regard to capital, and thus complete the overall TBTF package.
The intention is that Switzerland should continue to be a world-leading financial centre with a stable and competitive financial sector.
The aim in implementing the package is to draw lessons from the Credit Suisse crisis and close the gaps identified in the TBTF regime. It should significantly reduce the likelihood of another systemically important bank (SIB) in Switzerland experiencing a serious crisis, and of state emergency measures becoming necessary. For this reason, a large number of the measures relate to prevention.
In the event of a crisis, liquidity should be secured and the resolvability of a SIB ensured as a viable option. In this way, the Federal Council wants to minimise the risks to the economy and taxpayers.
Consultation draft on the Banking Act: These amendments relate to the design of senior managers regimes for banks, the introduction of bonus clawbacks for SIBs in the event of misconduct, additional powers for the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA (e.g. early intervention), improvements to SIBs' recovery and resolution planning, the strengthening of the resolution process and facilitating recourse to liquidity from the Swiss National Bank (SNB).
Consultation draft on the Liquidity Ordinance: To increase banks' resilience to liquidity shocks, requirements for banks to prepare assets in order to obtain liquidity support from the SNB and foreign central banks should be enshrined in legislation.
Where statutory amendments are necessary, the PInC initiatives that relate to the Banking Act or the Financial Market Supervision Act are implemented by the bill. The bill also implements motion 23.3604 Hegglin Peter, according to which it should be possible for vested benefits and Pillar 3a balances to be disbursed outside the ordinary ranking of creditors (i.e. faster and with priority) and without being subject to a ceiling. Postulates 24.3890 Meier Andreas (Contradiction between cooperation obligations and the freedom to make voluntary disclosures) and 25.4184 Rieder (Introduction of temporary public ownership) have likewise been addressed. Motion 23.3452 Stark (Limit remuneration in the banking sector) has also been implemented. The implementation of the initiatives is set out in chapter 1.4 of the explanatory report.
Yes, particularly with regard to a more proportional and proportionate implementation of the measures. The Federal Council has made adjustments in the following areas:
- Senior managers regime: This will only be introduced for banks with 250 or more employees (full-time equivalents) rather than for all banks, although FINMA may place smaller banks under this regime in individual cases. This change is due to the requirement's unfavourable cost-benefit ratio for smaller banks.
- Annual authorisation requirement for audit firms: This was removed, as the extra effort would be disproportionate.
- Mandatory rotation of audit firms: The deadline for implementing this change has been extended from 10 to 14 years, in order to bring down the associated costs and in turn improve the cost-benefit ratio. This change is a major factor in reducing the expected costs from CHF 21.5 million to CHF 12.7 million (according to an EXPERTsuisse estimate carried out as part of the regulatory impact assessment).
- Amendment of the Liquidity Ordinance: Banks in categories 4 and 5 are exempt from the preparation requirements. These banks are of minor importance in terms of financial stability and are not the focus of the TBTF regulatory efforts.
The sector was involved in multiple exchanges on a number of topics at technical level. It was also invited to participate in surveys on the regulatory impact assessment.
The bills are designed to be strongly proportionate. The measures are aimed primarily at banks whose size, complexity and risk profile make regulatory action necessary in order to strengthen the stability of the Swiss financial centre. The measures focus on SIBs. The scope of application will only be extended to cover other banks or financial institutions if such regulations already exist for these institutions at a lower level, or if the measure would have a positive impact on Swiss economic stability, irrespective of the institution's size and risk profile. Where possible, these measures are designed to be proportionate or to only have a direct impact on the supervised entities in the event of misconduct or a breach of supervisory law. The regulatory impact assessment has shown that the costs of measures with a broad scope of application are low overall.
The consultation for the proposed amendments to the Act and the Ordinance will run until 19 November 2026. Next year, the Federal Council will adopt the dispatch on the Banking Act for the attention of Parliament. The legislation will enter into force at the start of 2029 at the earliest.
The timetable for the Liquidity Ordinance will be aligned with the legislative proposal. The requirements cannot enter into force until there is certainty regarding the statutory transfer relief measures. Accordingly, the bill envisages that the requirements in the Liquidity Ordinance should apply from 2033.

General too-big-to-fail issue

The existing too-big-to-fail regime comprises requirements on capital, liquidity, and recovery and resolution planning. It was added to the Banking Act in 2012 and has been developed further in stages ever since. This has strengthened the SIBs' resilience. However, the Credit Suisse case in March 2023 revealed weaknesses and a clear need for action to further develop and strengthen the existing regulatory framework. For example, the current capital requirements are generally not forward-looking, and parent bank capitalisation is a critical aspect in the sale of foreign participations. As regards liquidity, the size and speed of outflows during the Credit Suisse crisis exceeded all previous empirical values. Moreover, the SNB's liquidity assistance was nowhere near enough – for example due to the bank not having enough appropriately prepared collateral. Finally, the aim is to reduce risks in the event of resolution, and to supplement recovery and resolution planning with additional variants and tools.
In principle, emergency state support should be avoided wherever possible. The aim of the too-big-to-fail regime is to avoid the need for state aid. Nevertheless, the option for the Federal Council to use emergency law in specific crisis situations, in the interests of the country and based on the Federal Constitution, should not be categorically ruled out.
The proposed measures are in line with international regulations and tools, and strengthen the Swiss financial centre's international competitiveness while taking account of Switzerland's special circumstances as a major financial centre with a G-SIB.
The Federal Department of Finance (FDF) carried out a regulatory impact assessment in accordance with the requirements of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER). The starting point was the question of the necessity and options for state action. The Credit Suisse crisis has shown that the TBTF regime does not sufficiently meet its objectives and that regulatory measures are therefore unavoidable.
During the regulatory drafting process, the authorities repeatedly examined options for action, discarded measures that were ineffective or too far-reaching, and defined the selected measures in more detail to enhance their efficiency. To assess the impact on the banks that were directly affected, they carried out surveys. Participation was voluntary, which resulted in low response rates in some cases. The authorities also assessed the impact on financial stability and the economy, particularly for businesses, investors and bank clients, as well as for the Confederation, cantons and communes.
The benefit of the comprehensive TBTF package lies in reducing the likelihood of a failure of systemically important functions, which would have adverse consequences for the economy as a whole, or of the need for a government bailout using taxpayers' money. This benefit to the economy as a whole is offset, in particular, by the additional workload and extra one-off and recurring implementation costs for the financial institutions concerned. Costs are reported in quantitative terms wherever possible; otherwise, they are reported in qualitative terms.
The effects of the bill are set out in detail in the separate regulatory impact assessment. It also shows the impact of the other bills in the TBTF package, thus enabling a comprehensive overview.
The Federal Council report based on Article 52 of the BankA will now be prepared and published every four years instead of every two years. It will, however, be more comprehensive and more strategically focused.
There are now plans for non-public annual reporting by FINMA to the parliamentary Control Committees (CCs) on the implementation of the TBTF regulations.

The key decisions

Corporate governance and remuneration

he Federal Council is proposing to introduce a senior managers regime and to enshrine it in law as an explicit organisational requirement. This regime assigns clear responsibilities to senior managers, so that they can more easily be held to account, either by the bank itself or by FINMA, in the event of a breach of duty. Similar arrangements already exist in other jurisdictions (UK, Hong Kong, Singapore, Ireland).
FINMA already has the power to issue prohibitions from practising a profession and from performing an activity, withdraw its recognition of guarantees of proper business conduct, or impose other measures on individuals. In practice, however, it is difficult to prove a breach of the rules by an individual.
The review following the publication of the Federal Council report revealed that there is a lack of clearly assigned responsibilities at non-systemically important banks too, which is preventing misconduct from being identified and sanctioned. The measure therefore aims to also establish an appropriate minimum standard at non-systemically important banks with complex organisational structures, to significantly boost good governance. Banks with fewer than 250 employees (full-time equivalents) will not be affected, unless FINMA imposes a senior managers regime in individual cases, specifically where deficiencies in corporate governance are apparent.
All banks should be subject to minimum principles that are to be complied with when designing the remuneration system. In particular, remuneration should be linked to the bank's long-term success and be risk-based. This means that the remuneration system must not incentivise employees to engage in inappropriate risk-taking.
Additional requirements apply to SIBs, as they pose a greater risk to the Swiss economy and the financial system.
Yes, in the case of SIBs the remuneration system must make provision for variable remuneration to be at least partly deferred for people subject to the guarantee requirement or those with a high total remuneration. These deferred remuneration components must be cancelled or reduced by the bank in the event of misconduct by such people.
Yes. The Federal Council is in favour of introducing clawbacks for SIBs. These could be used to reclaim salary components that have already been paid out.
Capping or prohibiting variable remuneration is not regarded as effective. Academic studies show that there are clear disadvantages. For instance, higher fixed salaries are observed as a side-effect. This increases the entity's fixed costs, which limits the options for cost-cutting, especially during a crisis.

Supervision

On the one hand, FINMA should be able to intervene more easily in various areas through more explicit, legally defined requirements (e.g. as regards early intervention in relation to the appropriate organisation of a bank). On the other hand, it should be able to enforce measures it has ordered more effectively by expanding its toolkit (e.g. public disclosure as a matter of course upon the conclusion of enforcement proceedings, periodic penalty payments). In addition, FINMA will receive new powers to fine legal entities and unlimited companies. FINMA will also slightly adjust the rules on appointing audit firms, to better ensure audit independence.
Pecuniary administrative sanctions (fines) are not the core element of the too-big-to-fail toolkit but they do help to strengthen supervision and are part of the standard toolkit at international level. Moreover, fines are regarded by the public as a sign that a financial institution has serious deficiencies. The plan to publish fines will therefore also have a preventive effect.
These are daily penalties that FINMA can impose if a supervised institution has not implemented the measures specified in an enforceable order even after a reminder and the expiry of a deadline. It is an enforcement tool to oblige supervised entities to comply with enforceable FINMA orders without delay. The daily penalty must not exceed 5% of the average daily operating revenue for the last three financial years, is limited to a maximum of six months, and payment does not release the supervised entity from the obligation to comply with the enforceable order.
FINMA already has the power to intervene in a bank in risk situations. So the intention is not to substantially extend FINMA's powers, but rather to refine the use of targeted measures in response to specific situations. This brings greater legal certainty to the system and encourages FINMA to act at the right time. It helps to ensure that overly drastic measures do not have to be taken when it is already too late. Furthermore, FINMA is bound in particular by the principles of legality and proportionality, and all FINMA rulings remain subject to judicial review.
For non-systemically important banks, the current system remains unchanged. For SIBs, in future FINMA has to publish the list of eased requirements granted, and impose deadlines on them. This measure, which was demanded by the PInC, ensures transparency for market participants. FINMA is already required to publish any eased requirements that have no time limit, and regularly review whether they need to remain in place.
By issuing a no-action letter, FINMA undertakes to temporarily refrain from taking supervisory or enforcement action. This applies to all supervisory instruments, and thus not only to FINMA but also to the auditors.

Ensuring liquidity during a crisis

Yes. On the one hand, the transfer of collateral to the SNB should be made easier (Banking Act). On the other hand, banks should prepare themselves better for liquidity shocks, in accordance with new regulatory requirements (Liquidity Ordinance).
The aim is to remove obstacles to the transfer of collateral to the SNB. Banks should be able to transfer loan receivables (e.g. mortgages) to the SNB more easily – even without the consent of the borrower and despite any prohibitions on assignment contained in the contract. This takes account of parliamentary initiative 25.411 Meier Andreas.
Such facilitations are intended to increase the volume of liquidity support granted by the SNB. However, they do not change the fact that the use of assets as collateral for obtaining central bank liquidity is contingent on the preparation work.
The existing Liquidity Ordinance regulates the requirements on bank's own liquidity provision by means of the liquidity coverage ratio, or LCR (the "first line of defence"). By introducing requirements for banks to make preparations for obtaining liquidity support from central banks, a second line of defence will be added to the Liquidity Ordinance. Better preparation by banks will make it possible for them to obtain greater amounts of liquidity support from the SNB.
Whereas SIBs will be subject to quantitative minimum requirements, banks in category 3 will be able to use the risk indicators in the Ordinance as a basis for determining the volume of assets to be prepared for obtaining liquidity support from central banks. Banks in categories 4 and 5 will be exempt.
“Preparation” refers to all necessary preparatory work by banks of a legal nature (e.g. supplementing customer contracts with clauses on the transfer of assets to the SNB) and operational nature (e.g. changes to internal bank systems and processes), undertaken with a view to obtaining rapid liquidity support from a central bank during periods of stress. These preparations are particularly important for assets that are not traded on the market. In the event of a liquidity shortfall, in which the affected bank must be able to react very quickly, the work carried out in advance should help to avoid legal and operational obstacles to the use of collateral for obtaining liquidity support from central banks.
Even though it will never be possible to completely eliminate the stigma problem, the Banking Act will introduce the option for banks that avail themselves of central bank liquidity facilities to postpone publication of an ad hoc announcement about recourse to central bank liquidity, in order to reduce the stigma problem.

Recovery and resolution

SIBs' ability to recover on their own following a crisis should be reinforced, thus reducing further the likelihood of insolvency. For this purpose, the legal requirements on recovery plans are to be tightened, especially as regards the scope and feasibility of recovery measures. In addition, the legal basis will be established for FINMA to order that measures be taken to remedy any deficiencies (particularly going-concern capital and liquidity surcharges).
The assessment of the Credit Suisse case has shown that the legal and implementation risks associated with a bank resolution must be reduced further. Specifically, the options available for resolution should be expanded and tailored to various crisis scenarios. Moreover, the legal certainty of existing instruments should be strengthened. In addition, and as demanded by the PInC, the international interconnectedness of SIBs is to be better reflected in the legal basis for resolution planning, thereby improving resolvability.
There is never 100% certainty. However, the proposed package of measures reduces, firstly, the likelihood of a situation ever getting that far. Secondly, should a SIB failure nonetheless occur, the likelihood of a successful resolution is increased.
The change of terminology ensures that there is a distinction between resolution under the Banking Act and restructuring under the Federal Act on Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy.
Resolution refers to an orderly intervention by FINMA in the event of a bank reaching the point of no-viability, where there is a prospect of the whole bank or individual services continuing, or of an orderly exit from the market. The aim is to maintain certain bank services, especially the systemically important ones in the case of a SIB, so as to stabilise the financial system, avoid the use of taxpayers' money or protect depositors' funds. This includes measures such as selling off parts of the bank, bail-in (where creditors participate in losses), spinning off certain assets, or otherwise intervening in the corporate structure. In the case of SIBs, a resolution procedure may be accompanied by a public liquidity backstop provided by the Confederation.

Cooperation between authorities

The current responsibilities and powers of the three authorities are to remain fundamentally unchanged. To date, cooperation has been regulated in a memorandum of understanding (MoU). This will now be enshrined at legislative level and made binding. In addition, two new bodies will be set up:
- The Financial Stability Council will replace the existing steering committee (strategic, meets once a year, presided over by the Head of the FDF).
- The Financial Stability Committee will replace the existing Committee on Financial Crises (operational, meets four times a year, presided over by the Chair of FINMA).
New statutory information and consultation obligations are planned (e.g. with regard to resolution plans or liquidity support from central banks). In addition, there is a requirement to conduct regular crisis exercises.

Dispatch on the Banking Act and Capital Adequacy Ordinance

Too-big-to-fail regulations: Federal Council adopts dispatch and Capital Adequacy Ordinance
In the future, systemically important banks in Switzerland will have to fully back their participations in foreign subsidiaries with Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital. This targeted measure is key to strengthening financial stability. Parliament will be able to debate the legislative proposal from summer 2026. At the same time, the Federal Council amended the Capital Adequacy Ordinance.
More about «Too-big-to-fail regulations: Federal Council adopts dispatch and Capital Adequacy Ordinance»

Press conference of the 22th April 2026

Documentation

The documents are available in German only.

Questions and answers

Parameters for the stability of the Swiss financial centre

Federal Council draws lessons from Credit Suisse crisis and defines measures for banking stability
The review of the Credit Suisse crisis showed that the too big to fail regime needs to be improved in order to reduce risks for the state, taxpayers and the economy. For this reason, during its meeting on 6 June 2025 the Federal Council determined the parameters for the corresponding amendments to acts and ordinances, which will be submitted for consultation in stages from this autumn onwards.
More about «Federal Council draws lessons from Credit Suisse crisis and defines measures for banking stability»

Press conference of the 6th June 2025

Questions and answers

Factsheets

Statements

FINMA - Capital backing for foreign participations
More about «FINMA - Capital backing for foreign participations»
SNB - Swiss National Bank supports measures to strengthen 'too big to fail' regulations
More about «SNB - Swiss National Bank supports measures to strengthen 'too big to fail' regulations»

Expert opinions

Too-big-to-fail report

10 April 2024
Federal Council report on banking stability
Based on Article 52 of the Banking Act and mandates from Parliament, the Federal Council has carried out an in-depth assessment of the regulation of systemically important banks.
More about «Federal Council report on banking stability»

Too Big To Fail

Amendments to Banking Act and Liquidity Ordinance

Too-big-to-fail regulations: Federal Council launches consultation on amendments to Banking Act and Liquidity Ordinance

Press conference of the 12nd August 2026

Documentation

Banking Act (and other legislation), amendment of 12 August 2026

Liquidity Ordinance, amendment of 12 August 2026

Explanatory report on the amendment of the Banking Act (and other legislation)

Explanatory report on the amendment of the Liquidity Ordinance

Comparison with existing law: Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks

Comparison with existing law: Ordinance on the Liquidity of Banks and Securities Firms

Regulatory impact assessment on the amendment of the Banking Act and the implementation of further measures from the Federal Council report on banking stability and the report of the Parliamentary Investigation Committee

Letter to the cantons regarding the consultation on the amendment of the Banking Act

Letter to the organisations regarding the consultation on the amendment of the Banking Act

Letter to the cantons regarding the consultation on the amendment of the Liquidity Ordinance

Letter to the organisations regarding the consultation on the amendment of the Liquidity Ordinance

List of addressees for consultation on the amendment of the Banking Act and of the Liquidity Ordinance

Overview table of individual measures

Questions and answers

Background to the bill

What prompted the revision of the Act and Ordinance?

What does the Federal Council wish to achieve by implementing the new too-big-to-fail measures?

What are the key decisions made by the Federal Council on 12 August 2026?

Which parliamentary initiatives will be implemented by the bill?

Has the Federal Council made any adjustments compared to the parameters it published on 6 June 2025?

How was the affected sector involved in drafting the Federal Council's proposals?

Do the bills take account of the proportionality principle?

What happens next? What is the timetable?

General too-big-to-fail issue

Is the existing too-big-to-fail regime not sufficient?

Can emergency state support be ruled out in the future?

What does the Federal Council's package of measures mean for the international competitiveness of Swiss-based SIBs?

How was the impact of the proposed amendments assessed?

How will the TBTF regulations be evaluated in the future?

The key decisions

Corporate governance and remuneration

How can we ensure that, in future, not only institutions but also individuals can be held more accountable for mismanagement?

Which banks will be subject to the senior managers regime?

What measures will be taken with regard to remuneration?

Can salary components that have not yet been paid out be reduced or cancelled in the event of mismanagement?

In cases of mismanagement, should it be possible to claw back salary components that have already been paid out?

Why does the proposal not envisage limitations on variable remuneration (bonuses)?

Supervision

Which new powers is FINMA to receive?

Up until now, FINMA has not been able to issue fines against non-compliant financial institutions. Why is this now planned?

What are periodic penalty payments and what are they for?

Does the extension of early intervention powers carry the risk that FINMA will intervene unnecessarily or arbitrarily?

Can FINMA continue to ease certain requirements for banks?

What is a “no-action letter” and what effect does it have?

Ensuring liquidity during a crisis

Will the liquidity support by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) be expanded?

What is the effect of the statutory facilitations with regard to liquidity preparation?

What provisions does the Liquidity Ordinance contain with regard to the preparation of collateral?

Owing to concerns that recourse to liquidity might be perceived by the market and depositors as weakness, banks are reluctant to avail themselves of liquidity support from central banks (stigma problem). Are measures planned to deal with this?

Recovery and resolution

What does the Federal Council intend to change with regard to the recovery of a SIB?

What does the Federal Council intend to change with regard to bank resolution?

Will these changes ensure the resolution of a SIB in Switzerland?

Why was the terminology harmonised to “resolution”?

Cooperation between authorities

How is cooperation between the authorities to be improved?

Dispatch on the Banking Act and Capital Adequacy Ordinance

Too-big-to-fail regulations: Federal Council adopts dispatch and Capital Adequacy Ordinance

Press conference of the 22th April 2026

Documentation

Botschaft Änderung Bankengesetz

Bankengesetz

Ergebnisbericht Vernehmlassung zur Änderung des Bankengesetzes

Eigenmittelverordnung

Ergebnisbericht Vernehmlassung zur Änderung der Eigenmittelverordnung

Erläuternder Bericht zur Eigenmittelverordnung

Rechtliche Kurzanalyse Prof. Corinne Zellweger-Gutknecht zur Abspaltung des US-Geschäfts von systemrelevanten Banken

Questions and answers

Questions and answers

Parameters for the stability of the Swiss financial centre

Federal Council draws lessons from Credit Suisse crisis and defines measures for banking stability

Press conference of the 6th June 2025

Speaking Notes TBTF / Karin Keller-Sutter, President of the Federal Council

Questions and answers

Questions and answers